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.SUMMARY
An analysis of the rendezvous radar as a guidance monitoring and failure
detection and isolation device during powered descent is mf,^le. The
results indicate the tracking radar is of little value to the crew in
this respect, largely because of the tape indicator limitations and the
large descent engine thrust, uncertainties.
INTRODUCTION
The role of the rendezvous radar (RR) in guidance monitoring and as a
failed guidance system detection and isolation device during the powered
phases of the LM mission has been the subject of discussion for some
time. An analysis of the descent guidax,:.- monitoring requirements
(reference 1) examined the use of the RR during the LM powered descent.
The analysis failed to identify the RR as a requirement in powered des-
cent, but concluded that the crew could use it if they desired. To
assure, however, that time would be available for use of the RR, refer-
ence 2 recommended to the AS-504 Flight Operations Plan panel that time
be allocated in the mission time-line for crew monitoring of the powered
phases using the RR. Because of the reference 2 recommendation, it
appears timely to enumerate some of the problems associated with use
of the RR In powered descent and to explain what can be expected of it
during this phase.
RENDEZVOUS RADAR AND TAPE METER
The RR, according to specifications, is expected to give CSM-LM relative
range and range rate to the 1/4% in the ranges encountered during powered
flight, but angular information will probably be of doubtful quality
(reference 2).	 Range data will have a bias of the order of 500 feet and
range rate data a bias of 1 ft/sec. 	 Because the RR primary guidance
computer interface is to be locked out during descent, all RR, data must
,.s be read from the tape displays. 	 With this display, resolution of crew-
read range will be 1 n .m. over the 0-400 n.m. tape range and the range
s ' rate resolution 0.5 ft/sec over the ±700 ft/sec range. 	 As .noted, there
will be no LOS or LOS data available in powered flight.
CSM-LM Relative Range -Range Rate Schedule During Powered Descent
A review of the nominal AS-504 reference trajectory shows that the range-
range ;rate schedule listed in Table I occurs during the first 400 seconds
.,;	 of powered descent. From Table 1, it is apparent that relative range rate
2Time(sec)
CSM-LM
Relative Range
(n.m. )
CSM-LM
Relative Rana Rate(ft/sect
0 178 +670
100 183 -135
150 -670
(digip1my limit)
200 174 -1150
300 146 -2100
400 1o6 -2600
Table 1 - AS-504 Powered .Descent Range-Range Rate Schedule
is not available to the crew past 150 seconds into the descent but that
relative range can be used throughout the time period indicated.
Use of Range-Range Rate Tape Indicator
As far as the crew is concerned, the tape display can be read to 1 nom.,
but because of range and meter inaccuracies, the relative range uncertainty
as read from the display is of the order of 2 n.m. throughout the descent.
The static resolution of the range rate tape indicator is 0.5 ft/sec, but
the tape indicator RR-range rate errors cause the estimated resolutions tD
be of the order of 2 ft/sec at the start of burn, 1 ft/sec at 100 seconds,
and 3 ft/sec at 200 seconds. This, however, is an optimistic estimation
because range rate is changed at a rate of the order of 10 ft/sec/sec and
greater in descent. Whether the crew can read the tape meter to these
accuracies under dynamic conditions is questionable. But this is of
academic interest, as will be shown later.
RANGE AND RANGE RATE DISPERSIONS
The CSM-I.i relative range and range rate measured by the RR have
dispersions which arise from a combination of navigational, primary
guidance system, and descent engine thrust uncertainties. The
dispersions of primary significance are those caused by the descent
engine thrust uncertainty, which can be as large as ±4% about the
nominal thrust. Because of this large thrust uncertainty, the
deviation from the reference trajectory range and range rate
schedules following the start of the descent burn is also large.
Thus, attempting to relate range and range rate to time to obtain
useful information is difficult, To illustrate this, the disper-
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3,-^ Range Rate Dis ersion
(ft/sec
Time G&N	 I Engine G&N Engine
0 0.50 0 3.0 0
100 0.52 .37 6.0 42
200 0.55 1.17
300 0.58 3oO
/,00 o.66 5.1
Table 2 - 3(:^Jl Range and Range Rate Dispersion
sions in range and range rate arising from the G&N uncertainties and those
caused by the ±4% engine thrust uncertainty have been listed in Table 2.
The large range and range rate uncertainties, coupled with the lack of
precise tape readout data, give rise to the problems of using the RR in
guidance monitoring and failure detection.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The analysis of reference 1 contains discussion of both guidance monitoring
and failed system isolation. Also contained in that reference is a tech-
nique for determining the level of trajectory deviation necessary before
the crew is assured of a 99.86% chance of detecting a failure. The results
of that analysis have been used to specifically analyze the rendezvous radar
with respect to guidance monitoring and failure detection.
Guidance Monitoring
The RR as a monitoring device must be used in an indirect manner. As
:ieither guidance system computes relative range rate, the crew must rely
on a graph of time history of both range and range rate and compare this
to the actual RR measurement at the time of suspected failure. If the RR
measures within the expected limits, the abort system is assumed failed
and if otherwise, the primary system is assumed failed.
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Use of Range Rate - In monitoring range rate, it is apparent from Table i
and the limitations of the tape indicator that the crew cannot use range
rate for more than 150 seconds of the descent. Furthermore, the crew, in
reading the tape, cannot be certain of range rate to better than 2 ft/sec,
which is within the initial guidance dispersion of 3 ft/sec. Thus, if
they can interpolate the tape reading to 3 ft/sec at the start of descent,
they are at least assured that the trajectory is within the 3 ^ bounds.
However, at 100 seconds, the engine-guidance dispersions are of the order
of 42 ft/sec and range rate data are of questionable value in monitoring
because the engine thrust uncertainty has masked all other uncertaintieso
About the only useful information derived from checking range rate would
be whether the engine was or was not operating within its expected 3,,-,f
thrust uncertainty.
Use of Range - The use of relative range to obtain a check on guidance
performance also leads to the same conclusion. Note that the expected
3.: guidance dispersion at the start of descent burn is about 0.5 n.m.
and that the tape indicator can be read to no better than 2 n.m. In this
case, the measuring instrument is four times worse than the guidance system
which means that the crew at best would be able to detect a failure causing
a 12.E range deviation. The ability to detect smaller trajectory devia-
tions becomes better as the descent continues, but only because the engine
dispersions swamp the guidance errors. As in the case of range rate, the
only thing relative range will tell the crew is that the engine is operating
or not operating within its expected thrust range.
Effect of Reducing Thrust Uncertainties to 2% - As an additional item it
should be noted that changing the engine thrust uncertainty to ±2% does
not necessarily alter the situation. The range rate uncertainty at 100
seconds changes to about 22 ft/sec of which 6 ft/sec arises from the
guidance system and 21 ft/sac can be attributed to the engine. The range
problem still exists too because the tape indicator cannot be read to the
required accuracy and also because of the large range dispersion.
Failed System Detection
Detection of a failed guidance system has been shown to be difficult because
of the engine thrust uncertainties coupled with the tape display resolution
problems. It is of interest, however, to calculate the trajectory devia-
tions that can be detected and then relate these deviations to guidance
component failures,,
Trajectory Deviations Required for 99.86% Detection Level - The engine-
guidance dispersions have already been shown in Table 1. To assure a
99.86% level of failure detection, the trajectory range uncertainty and
RR-tape indicator uncertainty must be added together and then rounded
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off to an integral number as the tape meter range resolution is rio better
than 1 n.m. Likewise, the RR and tape meter range rate uncertainties must
be added to the trajectory uncertainty and rounded off to the nearest 0.5
ft/sec. To a first approximation, multiplying these numbers by 3 gives
the number of 1.'! trajectory deviations that must occur before there is
at least 99.86% chance of detecting that a failure has occurred. The
results of these calculations are shown in Table 3. Notice that the
trajectory deviations for detection become smaller as the descent time
increases. This would be expected as the engine uncertainties predominate
and the range uncertainty eventually causes the tape indicator reading to
become more accurate relative to the range dispersion.
Range Range Rate
Time
sec
Range Error for
86	 Detection
Trajectory Error
ti aE
Range Rate Error
for 99,86% Detection
Trajectory Error
..=%
0 2.50	 (3.0)n.m 18 5.0	 ft/sec 5
100 2.64 (3.0) 14.1 42.6	 (1,3) 3.1
200 3.56	 (4.0) 7.7 78.7	 (79) 3.1
300 5.0	 (5.0) 5.0
400 7.1	 (8.0) 4.1
* (1 c4 = 1 standard deviation)
Table 3 - Trajectory Deviations Required for 99.86% Detection Level
Magnitude of Component Failures for 99086% Detection Level - Assuming that
the failed guidance system would be isolated at the instant a failure is
detected, the data of Table 3 can be related to guidance component failure
magnitude. These magnitudes have been listed in Table 4 for selected components.
Accelerometer Bias Misalinement Gyro Drift
Range Range Rate Range Range Rate Range Range Rate
Time
0
100 2020 284 233 40 2270 434
200 705 87 685
300 485 68 470
F400 370 53 357
Table 4 - Magnitude of Guidance Component Failures Detectable by
Using RR Measurement of Range and Range Rate
6The level of component failure that must occur before a guidance failure
can be detected is large and results almost entirely from the effect of
the engine thrust uncertainty in the powered descent coupled with the
display resolution and inaccuracies of the RR. Such failure levels
constitute a complete disruption of the primary guidance system functions,
and it is very likely the crew would be aware of these failures long before
the RR could detect them. As a note of interest, reference 1 shows that
the, same component failures can be detected at a .level one tenth of those
listed in Table 4 by monitoring altitude, altitude rate, and lateral
velocity using the landing radar or MSFN.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The RR, based on this analysis, appears to be of questionable value in
either monitoring guidance system performance or Im detecting and
Isolating a failed guidance system by casting the majority vote. The
reasons for this are: (1) the inability of the crew to read, and inter-
pret the range-range rate tape meter coupled with the expected RR error
and (2) the effect of the ±4% thrust uncertainty of the descent engine
on the trajectory which effectively swamps the guidance system errors.
Thief situation results from the fixed throttle limitation which restricts
the guidance system range adjustments until after approximately 400
seconds. In the range-free guidance scheme, of course, no attempt is
made to adjust for the deviations in range. An improvement in monitor-
ing would be possible by having either the primary or abort guidance
computers calculate relative range and range rate during descent. This
arrangement would allow the RR measurement of range and range rate to be
compared directly with the computer estimation of the same quantities.
If, however, the solution of range and range .rate by either guidance
system is not possible, then an improvement in failed guidance system
detection and isolation appears possible only if the engine thrust
uncertainty is reduced to a relatively small value.
Although the present software and hardware limitations existing in the LM
preclude the use of the RR in guidance monitoring, the equipment still playa
a useful role during powered descent, particularly if an abort occurs.
Normally, the LGC provides data for manual CSM search and lock-on or actually
performs this task automatically. If the abort is necessitated by an LGC
failure, the crew loses this capability and the command pilot mint manually
search to attain CSM lock-on. As this time period may be one of high crew
task loading, it would appear operationally sound to leave the RR operating
and locked-on during powered descent thereby relieving the crew of this
time consuming procedure in an abort situation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the results of this study, it is recommended:
1. The RR be in a powered-up configuration and locked-on to the
CSM during powered descent.
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2. An analysis be m gde to determine the feasibility of having the
W. compute LM-CSM rela,tiv,..- range and range rate during both powered
descent and ascent.
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